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Environmental information disclosure strategies, which involve corporate attempts to 
increase the availability of information on pollution and emissions, can become a basis for a 
new wave of environmental protection policy that follows and has the potential to 
complement traditional command and control and market-based approaches. Although a 
growing body of literature and operational programs suggest that publicly disclosing the 
information can motivate improved corporate environmental performance, this phenomenon 
remains poorly understood. This paper reviews the economic and legitimacy theory behind 
information disclosure and analyzes the current practice and programs adopted in 
industrialized and industrializing countries. Admittedly few in number, the cases studied 
reveal the advantages of such voluntary approaches, when the countries of developing Asia 
must deal with weak institutions, growing markets, and strong communities. Factors that 
contributed to widespread success of selected programs in the People’s Republic of China, 
India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the United States are information quality, the 
dissemination mechanisms, provision of incentives for good performers, and public and 
private pressure. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In Asia and elsewhere, maintaining environmental balance with rapid industrial growth is the 
subject of any safe policy. In the last few decades, several environmental laws have been 
enacted and numerous institutions set up to implement the objectives of these laws. But this 
traditional form of environmental protection—establishment of environmental legislation, 
standards, and punitive action in the case of failure to meet these regulatory requirements—
has been ineffective in controlling the environmental impacts caused by corporate activities. 
In developing and industrialized countries, these mandatory command and control 
approaches are costly and fail to achieve the expected goals when (i) emission sources are 
widely scattered across administrative boundaries; (ii) the gap is wide for the abatement cost 
caused by the use of obsolete machinery in industrial production process; and (iii) regulating 
agencies lack capacity and will to implement the standards.  
As a reaction to such shortcomings, a second wave of policy tools beginning from the 1970s 
witnessed the emergence of market-based approaches, mainly in industrialized economies 
as in the United States (US) and Europe. These include tradable permits, emission charges, 
and deposit refunds. In some cases, these market-based instruments have substituted 
regulatory approaches, but in most cases complemented them by enhancing flexibility, 
therefore improving the efficiency for pollution control policies (Tietenberg 1998). Noteworthy 
examples in Asia include emission charging systems being implemented in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), Malaysia, and Thailand, with varying degrees of success. 
Nevertheless, even in industrialized economies like the US, Germany, and Japan, this 
second wave of environmental policy tools have not been able to fully solve the 
environmental problems. In the industrialized countries, the system is overburdened by the 
sheer number of substances to be controlled (Kathuria and Sterner 2006). The reason for 
the limited use of market-based approaches in developing countries is due to difficulties 
associated with the capacity of environmental agencies to design, implement, monitor, and 
enforce such approaches in conjunction with other instruments (Jose 2008).
The ineffectiveness of regulative and market-based approaches to protect the environment 
highlight the significance of informal policy tools, such as public disclosure of corporate 
environmental information and rating schemes for improving environmental performance. 
Since the emergence of public disclosure programs in the 1990s, companies publicly provide 
information about emissions and pollutions. A rating system involves categorizing different 
firms on the basis of their environmental profile. In recent years, the reliance on information 
disclosure and rating has been made effective with the information revolution. According to 
Kolk (2004), this formed the beginning of the third wave of voluntary approaches that aim to 
improve corporate environmental performance. The expanding roles of disclosure strategies 
stem from (i) an increasing perceived need for more effective tools rather than simply relying 
on traditional command and control approaches, (ii) a  rising demand for environmental 
information from communities and markets, and (iii) decreasing cost of information collection 
and dissemination. 
  
2.  TYPES AND SETTINGS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE  
Although environmental information disclosure approaches like ecolabeling are extensively 
used in natural resource and consumer acceptance settings, as in forest certification 
programs or organic food retailing, their use in industrial environment settings—pollution and 
emission control—has started picking up only very recently. Labeling of products and public 
disclosure of environmental information of manufacturing processes provide signals to 
investors, consumers, regulators, and the general public about the relative and absolute 
levels of environmental impacts of polluters (Grafton et al. 2004). The most widely used ADBI Working Paper 305         Anbumozhi, Chotichanathawong, and Murugesh 
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signaling devices are those indicating that an appliance or a product has achieved some 
level of environmentally benign requirements, e.g., energy efficiency ratings for electrical 
appliances and ecofriendly consumer products like recycled paper. While ecolabels and 
awards convey a signal of how environment-friendly a product or company is, process-based 
information disclosure is gaining increasing attention in company board rooms, where 
environmental risk liability is an issue. 
Depending on the way information is conveyed, environmental information disclosure can be 
of three types. Type 1 is the certification of products, firms, processes, or management 
procedures by third  parties, e.g., ecolabel certification, ISO certification. Type 2 is self-
certification without any fixed criteria or any externally independent review, e.g., corporate 
social responsibility reports published by companies. Provision of raw data, with some 
interpretation or judgment, form type 3, into which rating and award schemes could be 
classified (Lopez et al. 2004).  
The use of environmental information disclosure also depends upon the setting in which it 
has arisen (Coglianese and Nash 2001). Disclosure can be used in a household setting, 
such as buying lead-free gasoline, or an occupational setting, such as when workers are 
exposed to suspended particulate matters in manufacturing plants, or a product setting, such 
as when consumers buy products with pesticide residue, or a community setting, such as 
when residents are subjected to toxic emissions or effluent discharge from a nearby factory.  
3.  WORKING CHANNELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
Environmental information disclosure works through different channels. Since the 
effectiveness of environmental information disclosure lies in aligning the behavior of a 
corporate body with the interest of society, this can be done through the product market, 
capital market, insurance market, or legislation and the judiciary (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Working Channels of Environmental Information Disclosure 
 
Source:Authors. 
In the product market, environment-conscious consumers express their support for 
responsible companies by boycotting environment-damaging products, if information is 
provided for different options. Even if consumers are not directly harmed by the pollution or 
emission, they may select a green product, such as paying more for recycled paper. In this 
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the purchase decisions of large buyers like government offices or chain stores. In the capital 
market, investors may decide to invest in companies with a more green record, either for 
moral reasons because of their belief that environmentally responsible corporate bodies will 
incur fewer risks and hence will be more competitive in the long run. In the same way, 
financial institutions may be more cautious in providing credit to environment-damaging firms 
as they can combine pollution or emission-related liability into their lending decisions. 
International investors are also keen to know more about the potential liability they could be 
involved in by forging direct investment (Janakiraman and Jose 2007). Foreign investors 
associate poor environmental performance with financial risks and liabilities. Evidence also 
suggests that green firms may have higher rates of return (Khanna et al. 1997).  In 
industrialized countries like Japan and the US, and in the European region, the ability of 
green investors to make these choices has been facilitated by the rise of several green 
mutual funds where investment advisors carefully screen the firms using well-defined criteria 
(Tietenberg 1998). Hamilton (1995), and Konar and Cohen (1997), using US 1989 toxic 
release inventory (TRI) data, found that polluters that reported emissions lost on average 
US$4.1 million in the value of the traded stock of the day when the news was released. 
Evidence also suggests that polluting companies have responded to negative signals and 
total releases declined by nearly half during 1988–1998, although a part of this fall may be 
due to firms substituting chemicals not listed on TRI (Grafton et al. 2004).  
In the labor market of developed countries like Japan,  environmentally conscientious 
employers may find it easier to hire and to retain employee loyalty. This may not be very 
relevant in many developing countries in Asia, where often large polluting and emitting 
companies are also significant employment providers. In the legislature, if existing legislation 
seems inadequate, the information provision may result in community support for additional 
legislation. Lastly, in the judicial system, parties directly harmed by the polluting industries 
can retrieve compensatory damages by suing polluters or through public interest litigation. In 
countries such as India, the right to a clean and safe environment is fundamental for each 
individual and this can be enforced through judicial action when other systems fail to 
respond (Jose 2008).  
Environmental information disclosure and ratings have multidimensional benefits for different 
stakeholders.  Communities  are in a much stronger position to negotiate environmental 
agreements with neighboring companies. This is essential because lack of information can 
distort a community’s perception of industrial activities (Dasgupta and Wheeler 1999). The 
stock market can more accurately value corporate environmental performance and banks 
can factor environmental pollution-related liability into their lending decisions (Khanna and 
Damon 1997). For consumers, availability of information through outlets such as the internet 
may greatly influence their decisions.  
The regulator may itself benefit from public disclosure. More compliance with environmental 
standards can boost its credibility with industry, nongovernment organizations, and the 
public (Wheeler et al. 2000). Further, the ratings and public disclosure of environmental 
information by companies allow communities to check regulators’ claims against their own 
daily experience, thereby indirectly affecting the credibility of the agency. The disclosure 
promotes useful learning across firms (Afsah and Laplante 2007). A good rating for a firm 
among its competitors establishes the feasibility of cleaner production and encourages other 
firms to invest more in pollution-reducing and -mitigating equipment. Disclosure also 
promotes  managers’  awareness of their own firms’ pollution (Lopez et al. 2004).  This 
discussion highlights the special role of environmental information disclosure as an 
instrument in its own right, as well as a prerequisite for other regulatory and market-based 
instruments.  ADBI Working Paper 305         Anbumozhi, Chotichanathawong, and Murugesh 
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4.  ECONOMIC EXPLANATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
The economics of environmental information disclosure can be observed from how the 
equilibrium for environmental protection in a region is determined. The environment of a 
region is usually characterized by its carrying capacity. Any firm operating in the community 
essentially uses this absorptive capacity, reflecting a demand for environmental services. 
Plants can either use this service completely or reduce emissions by adopting some 
mitigation measures. Thus, for a cost-minimizing manufacturer, the environment demand 
schedule reflects its marginal abatement cost. This can be thought of as the firm’s marginal 
willingness-to-pay for pollution abatement. The more the plant abates, the less will be its 
demand for environmental services. Moreover, it becomes progressively more expensive for 
the plant to abate at low pollution levels. The regional marginal abatement cost or 
environment demand schedule could be crudely approximated as a sum over all the plant-
level schedules, which slopes downward to the right as illustrated in Figure 2. As the price of 
environmental services rises, the industry would prefer to reduce pollution along this 
schedule (Hartman et al. 1997). The environmental demand schedule is generally affected 
by three major factors: (i) external pressure through the markets or investors, which in turn is 
influenced by pubic disclosure and ratings; (ii) economic considerations; and (iii) plant 
characteristics. Important plant characteristics like ownership, size, market orientation, 
human and technical capital, and availability of abatement technologies, which have 
relatively less relevance for small and medium-scale industries, have a direct influence on 
the environmental demand schedule of large plants. 
Figure 2: Impact of Environmental Information Disclosure  
on Equilibrium Pollution in a Region  
 
Source: Adapted from Wheeler, B., and S. Afsah Lalpante. 2000. Greening Industry: New Roles for Communities, 
Markets and Governments, World Bank Policy Research Report, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Note: ED: Environmental Demand; MAC: Marginal Abatement Cost; ES: Environmental Supply; MEP: Marginal 
Environmental Protection. 
With effective formal regulation, environment services always carry a price for a plant. But 
for most developing countries of Asia, the price is too little to impact regional pollution. This 
is due to ineffective formal regulation and concentration-based standards. The price could 
easily be augmented through public disclosure or the people affected could act in their own 
self-interest provided they have information about the pollution and emission discharges. 
Hartman et al. (1997) argue that in regions devoid of formal regulation, communities confront 
local polluting plants with their own demands for environmental services. This community 
demand curve reflects three basic factors: the community’s ability to (i) monitor emissions, 
(ii) assess damages (both indicate information costs), and (iii) bargain to enforce 
environmental protection norms—reflecting transaction costs. These three aspects reflect ADBI Working Paper 305         Anbumozhi, Chotichanathawong, and Murugesh 
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the community assessment of marginal social damage and are summarized in a locally 
enforceable environmental supply schedule. Thus, the environmental supply curve reflects 
the price communities require industries to pay for different levels of pollution. With 
increases in damage, communities impose progressively higher costs on polluting plants. 
This implies that the environmental supply schedule slopes upward to the right in Figure 2. 
The equilibrium pollution level in a region or community is determined at the point where the 
environmental demand and environmental supply schedules intersect. Environmental 
information disclosure programs take care of the information aspect of the pollution 
discharge and influence both the environmental supply and environmental demand 
schedules (Kathuria and Sterner 2006). Public disclosure and rating facilitate shifting the 




5.  LEGITIMACY THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
), thereby increasing the price 
of pollution for a unit as shown in Figure 1. Any increase in external pressure or price of 
environmental services induces the plant to reduce pollution, thereby shifting the 
environmental demand schedule to the left. This ultimately leads to a fall in pollution from B 
to A even to C (Figure 2). 
The theory of legitimacy can also explain the reasons behind the disclosure of environmental 
information. In developing countries, information about environmental risks associated with 
industrial activities is asymmetrically distributed. In a typical case, the best knowledge about 
emissions or a pollution profile is held by the corporate bodies and/or regulators, not the 
community in the absence of outside pressure to do so. In addition, in most developing 
countries, bureaucratic inertia and/or legal constraints frequently constrain or even prevent 
information sharing. Legitimacy theory, developed by Prabhu (1998) and Neu et al. (1998), 
posits that business organizations must consider the rights of the community at large, not 
merely those of investors. If the corporations do not appear to operate within the bounds of 
the behavior considered appropriate by the community, then the community will act to 
remove the organization’s right to continue its operations. When an actual and potential 
disparity exist between the business and social value systems, this will lead to threats to 
organizational legitimacy in the form of legal, economic, and other sanctions. Neu et al. 
(1998) also argue that the legitimacy of an organization is constructed and maintained 
through symbolic action, which forms part of the organization’s public image. They argue 
that it is often easier to manage an organization’s image through environmental information 
disclosure. The three well-known strategies of information disclosure for image creation are 
(i) attempting to educate and inform the relevant public about recent corporate actions that 
remedy previously perceived deficiencies, (ii) attempting to change the perceptions of other 
external stakeholders, and (iii) attempting to deflect attention from the perceived problem 
areas by changing the focus of the external public. 
Contemporary community is increasingly organized by the internet, newspapers, magazines, 
and annual reports. While the symbolic aspects of corporate actions have been central to 
legitimacy, these textually mediated discourses have more recently been seen to fulfill 
similar functions. Given the inaccessibility of most corporate activities, the public have come 
to rely on words and numbers available in annual reports and environment statements as 
proxies for these activities. Therefore, business uses information provided in sustainability 
reports as a communication mode to establish legitimacy and a mode of managing public 
impressions. Adams (2002) had a similar observation and argued that the reason for the 
increase in the number of companies producing environment reports is not regulation or 
public pressure but the desire to improve the corporate image with customers, regulators, 
investors, and the community. However environmental information disclosures are regarded 
as the pivotal instruments of corporate communication. Within industry subsectors like 
pharmaceutical, chemicals, mining, transport, electronics, and automobiles, whose activities ADBI Working Paper 305         Anbumozhi, Chotichanathawong, and Murugesh 
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either result directly in high environmental impacts or are at least are suspected of causing 
them, empirical evidence exists (Fichter 1998, Larsen 2000, Kolk 2004) that environmental 
information disclosure has become a competitive relevance.  
6.  GOOD CASES OF ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION 
DISLOSURE IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 
Ecolabeling and ratings that fall into type 1 disclosure strategy have increasingly been used 
as effective instruments to make production and consumption patterns more sustainable in 
industrialized economies, like Japan and the US and those in Western Europe. The 
European countries, for example, have used ecolabeling since 1989 for their industrial 
products. Australia adopted an energy efficiency star rating system in the late 1980s. The 
results of these ecolabeling and EMS programs are encouraging, but limited to select 
sectors. 
Type 2 information disclosure includes environmental reporting and is entering into the 
business mainstream as part of corporate affairs in select sectors. This is true not only for 
environmental pioneers and sector leaders but also for global companies and multinationals 
whose activities result directly in high environmental impacts. But companies also realize 
that the honeymoon period, in which environmental reports received media and public 
attention just for themselves rather than for what they disclosed, is over (Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu International et al. 1993). Today, substantive information is required and 
corporate reporting is successful only if the underlying environmental system is appropriate, 
and the associated process is effective and operational (UNEP and SustainAbility 1994). 
This needs setting of environmental goals, assigning responsibilities to reach these goals, 
and assessing the outcomes. 
Type 3 disclosure strategies, which involve making raw data available, are effective in some 
countries. In the public disclosure programs of developed countries, good examples include 
the TRI of the US, started in 1987; Canada’s national release inventory started in 1993; and 
the United Kingdom’s pollutant inventory and Australia’s national pollutant inventory, both 
started in 1998 (Lopez et al. 2004). Although the structures of these programs are different, 
they share the common principles of environmental information disclosure. 
The TRI has become a successful model for disclosure programs in terms of effectiveness in 
reducing toxic release. It was enacted by the US Congress in January 1986 as a part of the 
Environmental Protection and Community Right to Know Act to provide information to the 
public on releases of toxic substances into the environment. Incidentally most of the 
substances involved are not subject to any standards or regulations. Starting with nearly 300 
substances, the US Environmental Protection Agency modified the list and added 286 
chemicals in 1994, leading to a total or more than 640 chemicals. The TRI states that firms 
using  25 tons or more of a listed chemical in a given calendar year, or firms importing, 
processing, or manufacturing 25,000 pounds or more of a listed chemical must provide a 
report on each of the chemicals in existence within the plant, provided the firm employs 10 or 
more full-time workers. The reports should include information such as the name of the 
company, name of the parent company if it exists, toxic release and frequency of release, as 
well as the medium in which the chemical is released (Tietenberg 1998). 
To complement and reinforce the TRI program, the Environmental Protection Agency 
initiated the 33/50 program, which set national goals for 17 prioritized toxic chemicals to 
reduce them by 33% by 1992 and 50% by 1995 from the 1988 level. These reductions were 
to be achieved voluntarily and compliance was to be measured by the TRI reports. The 
emphasis of TRI and 33/50 programs are environmental protection or pollution prevention 
rather than end-of-pipe treatment. Initially 555 companies with significant chemical release 
were included, but later on the program was expanded to 5,000 companies. Nearly 26% of 
companies agreed to participate in the program. By 1994, a year before the deadline, they ADBI Working Paper 305         Anbumozhi, Chotichanathawong, and Murugesh 
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collectively reduced emissions by more than 50%, a total of 757 million pounds of pollutants. 
However, the total release of all the TRI firms was reduced significantly by 45% in 1998. 
Table 1 gives the data of TRI firms in the selected years.  
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Source: United States Environmental Protection Agency. 2000. Toxic Release Inventory Program, 1998 Public Data 
Release Report. www.epa.gov/triinter/tridata/tri98/pdr/index.htm (Accessed on 14 April 2008). 
7.  ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
PROGRAMS IN DEVELOPING ASIAN COUNTRIES 
Since the Rio conference in 1992, public disclosure of environmental schemes have found 
acceptance in several countries of developing Asia. These include PROPER of Indonesia, 
EcoWatch of the Philippines, and Green Watch of the PRC. Table 2 gives a summary of how 
implementation of the environmental information disclosure schemes led to increased 
compliance in these countries.  
































































































Source: World Bank. 2006. Public Disclosure: A Tool for Controlling Pollution. Research Digest 8–23, Washington, 
DC. 
7.1  PROPER in Indonesia 
Indonesia’s local environmental agency, BAPEDAL has made effective use of the 
environmental information disclosure performance ratings. BAPEDAL had earlier tried 
regulations by enforcing penalties, closures, and fines, but was not very successful given the 
political environment in which it was operating. It was also wary of market-based instruments 
like environmental charges, because of concerns that charges might tempt individual officers 
of the agency into corruption (Blackmen et al. 2004). Hence, they chose a rating or labeling ADBI Working Paper 305         Anbumozhi, Chotichanathawong, and Murugesh 
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scheme, the Programme for Pollution Control Evaluation and Rating (PROPER), where firms 
are rated in five different colors depending upon their environmental performance. In the first 
18 months, effluents from the firms that were labeled were reduced by 40% as they strove to 
avoid the shame of being rated as “black” or “red” firms rather than “blue” (compliant) or 
even “green.” Figure 3 gives the steps undertaken by BAPEDAL in implementing PROPER. 
Figure 3: Steps Involved in Developing PROPER  
 
Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency. The PROPER: Indonesian Success Story. 
Since BAPEDAL was working in a difficult political milieu and previous efforts to improve 
corporate environmental performance through command and control approaches were not 
successful, credibility to the scheme was essential. To enhance the credibility with all 
stakeholders in implementing PROPER, BAPEDAL developed a careful process for 
scrutinizing the ratings through three checkpoints: (i) an advisory board with representatives 
from academia, industry, other government agencies, and community-based institutions; (ii) 
the environment minister; and (iii) the President. The mood and effect on the corporate 
community was upbeat with the knowledge that the President of Indonesia had approved the 
ratings. The participant base is increasing rapidly (Figure 4). 





2004 05 06 07 08 09 10
 
Source:  Japan International Cooperation Agency. The PROPER: Indonesian Success Story. 
7.2  EcoWatch in the Philippines 
The Philippines introduced EcoWatch in 1996 with a basis similar to PROPER. In December 
1996, the President, in the presence of the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources and the Laguna Lake Development Authority, signed a memorandum of 
agreement with 23 business associations, representing some 2,000 corporations, and 
formally launched the industrial EcoWatch Program. The project was designed to provide a 
strong incentive to industries to comply with environmental regulations and to reward those 
whose environmental performance exceeds standard requirements.
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government to set up an environmental grading system to categorize the environmental 
performance of these firms using a five-color (gold, blue, green, brown, and black) labeling 
system, similar to the one used for PROPER. A black label is used for firms with no pollution 
control or causing serious damage to the environment; blue for firms that meet all 
environmental standards and required procedures, such as self-reporting of pollution data; 
and gold for firms that meet environmental standards for 3 years continuously and conduct 
at least two environmental programs such as waste reduction and recycling projects. 
The EcoWatch rating scheme was introduced as conventional regulations failed to reduce 
pollution. Under EcoWatch, in the initial evaluation of 52 plants, more than 92% were found 
to be noncompliant, i.e., with red or black ratings. However, rating led to increased 
environmental performance, with the number of plants with blue rating increasing from 8% to 
58% in 1998. The developers of the EcoWatch disclosure program pursued a similar political 
strategy as the one used in PROPER. The President formally announced EcoWatch along 
with leaders of the Philippines Business Association, who encouraged association members 
to participate in the program. The program allowed poorly rated factories a grace period 
before public disclosure. A critical step in the design of the project was to include the 
corporate representatives in the elaboration of the program from the beginning, with the 
result that the private sector, through the signing of the EcoWatch project agreement, 
committed to support project implementation.  
7.3  Green Watch in the People’s Republic of China 
A rating system, defined by the Green Watch Program, initiated in the PRC in 1999, divides 
corporate environmental performance into five categories, with black and red denoting 
inferior performance, yellow denoting compliance with national regulations but failure to 
comply with stricter local requirements, and blue and green denoting superior performance. 
In Technical Guideline for Corporate Environmental Performance Evaluation and Rating, 
issued by the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), three types of 
indicators are used: pollutant emissions, environmental management, and social impacts. 
For pollutant emissions, 13 pollutants were selected to assess whether the company could 
meet the standards for concentration and total emission load. For environmental 
management, basic requirements on environmental management were selected, such as 
paying the pollution charge on time; reporting environmental statistics data on schedule and 
exactly; properly managing pollutant outlets; conducting environmental impact assessment 
(EIA); managing environmental capacity, obtaining environmental management system 
(EMS) certification, and conducting cleaner production auditing. Social impact indicators 
include public complaints, emergent environment cases, large illegal cases, and 
administrative penalties (SEPA 2005). The program’s color-coded ratings are the results 
generated by auditing environmental performance using the indicators described. The 
criteria and rating procedure are illustrated in Figure 5. 
The ratings system draws on four principal sources of information: reports from firms; 
inspection reports on environmental management; records of public complaints, regulatory 
action, and penalty records; and surveys that record characteristics of the firms that are 
relevant for rating environmental performance. SEPA wishes to build up an incentive 
mechanism for industrial pollution prevention and control, based on the measures addressed 
by the rating systems in the pilot project in Jiangsu province. These measures are likely to 
become increasingly popular at local levels. This environmental performance rating system 
provides incentives for continuous improvement because it recognizes three differentiated 
levels for firms to comply with national standards. Even for noncompliant companies, the 
system rewards improvement efforts by recognizing two levels of differentiated performance. 
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Figure 5: Environmental Performance Rating Framework  
in the People’s Republic of China. 
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Source: Bi 2007.  
Figure 6 indicates the results of the environmental performance rating program being 
conducted in Jiangsu Province (Bi 2007): 1,069 enterprises were evaluated in 2001 based 
on the previously described criteria. By 2005, the program covered more than 8,000 
enterprises. Encouragingly, the ratio of enterprises colored red and black decreased from 
17.18% in 2001 to 10.56% in 2005. It shows that PRC enterprises are concerned about 
being put on the environmental black list and try to abide by the basic requirements for 
pollution control. ADBI Working Paper 305         Anbumozhi, Chotichanathawong, and Murugesh 
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Figure 6: Effects of the Environmental Performance Rating Program in Jiangsu 
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Source: Bi 2007. 
7.4  Green Rating Project in India  
In the late 1990s, the Centre for Science and Environment initiated the Green Rating Project 
(GRP) in India. The project aimed to monitor the environmental performance of Indian 
companies and rank them based on performance. In the first phase, the pulp and paper 
industry, comprising 31 large firms, was selected. The first rating was released in 1999 with 
none of the plants having good scores. The rating disclosure however anticipated the 
improvement of the plants’ environmental management performance over time. The 
conjecture arises from the fact that before the GRP started only one company had an 
environment policy as part of its operations, but when the companies got associated with the 
GRP, eight more companies adopted an environment policy. This reflects the potent force of 
reputation through disclosure.  
Evidence indicates the significance of such disclosures. When the largest paper-producing 
company did not respond to the requisite information, the default option of rating it last was 
considered and this option was communicated to the head of the company. Within a week, 
the rating agency received a response from the head assuring full cooperation. In the end, 
the company secured the third place. To give credibility to the project, a project advisory 
panel was constituted comprising industry leaders, judges, research and development 
experts, academicians, environmentalists, journalists, and other eminent members of 
society. To evaluate the ecological effect of the technology used by the plants, a three-
member technical panel from the pulp and paper subsector was formed to help the rating 
process. After the rating of pulp and paper, the Centre for Science and Environment got 
involved in the rating of a few other polluting sectors, including chlor-alkali, automobiles, and 
the cement industry. The rating program in India is found to have a significant impact on 
improving corporate environmental performance. Table 3 summarizes the major impact of 
the rating process in three industries. ADBI Working Paper 305         Anbumozhi, Chotichanathawong, and Murugesh 
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  Table 3: Major Impact of the Rating Process in Three of Industries in India 
Industry Sector  Before the GRP  After the GRP 
Pulp and Paper  Less than 10% of companies 
substituted chlorine dioxide (an 
environment-friendly substitute) 
for chlorine 
Around 90% of companies substituted 
chlorine dioxide for chlorine  
Elemental chlorine (Cl) 
consumption is about 75 
kilograms (kg)/ton paper 
Elemental Cl consumption ≈ 48 kg/ton-
paper  
First elemental chlorine-free plant in India 
No standard for absorbable 
organic halides (AOX, a group of 
potent carcinogens) depends on 
consumption of elemental 
chlorine 
Standard for AOX introduced and monitored 
for the paper industry; led to a shift from 
elemental chlorine for bleaching and 
reduced AOX load 
No standards for color of the 
treated effluent from paper 
manufacturing units 
The Indian states of Andhra Pradesh and 
Tamil Nadu set PCB standards for color of 
the treated effluent from paper 
manufacturing units 
No water consumption guidelines 
for the sector 
Water consumption guidelines in paper 
manufacturing introduced 
Chemical  > 50% of mercury consumed in 
the sector is lost and 
unaccounted for, as monitoring 
EOP emissions in case for 
mercury is not feasible; the 
solution was to regulate mercury 
input 
Government of India put in place guidelines 
to regulate input mercury  
Use of mercury cell technology—
high emission of mercury 
Switchover to membrane technology 
facilitated through (i) subsidies for the 
import of membrane technology, and (ii) 
reduction of customs duty on components 
of membrane cell technology used in the 





sourcing raw materials and 
components from small and 
medium-scale sector, which had 
neither resources nor intent to 
control pollution 
Companies like Ford, Mercedes, General 
Motors, Hero, and Honda set clear policy on 
outsourcing, keeping environmental 
performance of the supplier in mind; Ford 
and General Motors asked suppliers to get 
ISO 14001 
Companies transferring old 
technology to their Indian 
subsidiaries 
Hyundai Motors publicly committed to 
supply similar technology to India as it does 
to Europe or America 
Rainwater harvesting: less or no 
efforts on rainwater harvesting 
Companies like Hero Motors, General 
Motors, and Eicher Motors started rainwater 
harvesting within their plants to reduce 
external water demand 
Source: CSE 2006 and interviews. 
The objective of the GRP was not only to disclose the current environmental performance of 
companies, but also to suggest ways to improve their activities. The impact of the project on 
the improved environment can be seen in Figure 7. Both high rated—2 or 3 leaves—and low 
rated—I leaf—firms reported progressive improvement in environmental conditions as 
measured items of biological oxygen demand and total suspended solids emitted from the 
plants. Even though these figures indicate that poorly performing companies declined after 
1999, there is no clear proof that GRP ratings drove these reductions. Other control factors 
like regulatory, market, and community pressures, as well as sectorwide technological 
change might have caused this. However, the results strongly suggest that GRP drove 
emission reductions for plants that received a one-leaf rating in 1999. These findings support ADBI Working Paper 305         Anbumozhi, Chotichanathawong, and Murugesh 
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previous analyses of environmental information disclosure programs in other developing 
countries that show that disclosure has the greatest impact on poorly performing industrial 
units.  
Figure 7: Impact of the Green Rating Program on the Environmental Performance  
of 21 Rated Companies 
 
Source: Centre for Science and Environment. 2006. Profile Plus Process. Green Rating Project Report. Centre for 
Environmental Studies, New Delhi. 
7.5  Carbon Reduction Labeling and Carbon Footprint Program in 
Thailand 
The Carbon Reduction Labeling Program is a voluntary certification program for commercial 
products and services started in 2008 in Thailand, and organized by Thailand Greenhouse 
Gas Management Organization and Thailand Environmental Institute. The carbon reduction 
label is a certification for products or services that achieve greenhouse gas emission 
reductions over its lifecycle, measured against certain criteria. The product or service has to 
meet one of the following three  criteria to qualify for the label: (i) achieve at least 10% 
greenhouse gas emission reduction over the last 12 months compared with the base year 
(2012), (ii) meet criteria for power consumption and waste management, or (iii) be 
manufactured from less carbon intensive technology compared with the industry average, 
which will be closely reviewed by the Carbon Label Promotion Committee on case-by-case 
basis. Criteria (ii) includes three conditions: (i) electricity supplied is generated on-site from 
biomass or waste, and power purchased from an external supplier is no more than 5% of 
total electricity requirement; (ii) no fossil fuel is consumed in the manufacturing process 
except for boiler or gas engine start-up and transport within the manufacturing facility; and 
(iii) waste generated from the process does not emit greenhouse gases. The approval 
process includes submission of an application, a field visit, and a review by a carbon 
reduction label technician team and carbon reduction label committee; this takes 
approximately 2 months. After passing these processes, the product or service will be 
certified and given the carbon reduction label (Figure 8), which will be valid for 3 years. 
Figure 8: Carbon Reduction Label in Thailand 
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As of March 2010, 69 products from 15 producers had been certified for the label. They 
include food, personal products, construction materials, packaging, and other personal and 
industrial goods. The carbon reduction label has two benefits: (i) customers can participate 
in the climate change mitigation initiative more easily by having more informed choices for 
purchases;  and (ii)  companies can demonstrate their  commitment to greenhouse gas 
emission reduction, enhance business competitiveness for the  environment-conscious 
customer segment, and potentially reduce manufacturing costs  through more energy-
efficient processes and waste minimization. As products  and  services  with  the carbon 
reduction label are more competitive or first choices for customers, companies will start to 
make continuous efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This positive spiral has a 
potential to drive society to become more environmentally conscious. 
The carbon reduction label only considers the scope of carbon reduction. Currently only the 
production phase is considered in measuring carbon reduction. In an extreme case, a 
product that reduced greenhouse gas emissions from the manufacturing process in return 
for  an  emission increase from other processes could be qualified. Thus, measurement 
methodologies for greenhouse gas emission from supply, usage, and disposal need to be 
developed and considered as a criterion. 
A barrier observed in the implementation is readiness of both the business sector 
and consumers. The business sector, especially small and medium-sized 
enterprises, are  showing  limited interest in participating in the program, and 
greenhouse gas emission data including historical data is limited. The other side of 
equation is limited understanding by consumers. Currently the value and meaning of 
the carbon reduction label is not well understood and appreciated, so manufacturers 
are not adequately sensitized and are not motivated to be involved in the program. 
7.6  Carbon Disclosure Project: Global 
The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is a not-for-profit organization based in London. It has 
a global climate change reporting system, and has the largest database of primary corporate 
climate change information in the world. 
In 2009, approximately 2,500 companies measured and disclosed carbon information 
through the CDP platform. The track record in terms of the number of participants (Figure 9) 
shows high and growing interest in climate change information disclosure from corporations.  
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Source: Carbon Disclosure Project. https://www.cdproject.net 
Corporations can disclose climate change information by either responding to information 
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corporations worldwide. In 2009, it reported the highest response rate from companies in the 
history of the CDP—82%, with growing response from Brazil, Russia, India, and the People’s 
Republic of China (BRIC) countries. 
The information from individual companies and the consolidated report can be obtained from 
the CDP; more than 500 investors and 60 purchasing organizations are said to leverage 
information from this site. Users can compare and benchmark companies to apply in making 
business decisions. 
This globally standardized initiative with a large number of participants not only provides 
transparency to shareholders and the general public, but also enhances corporate efforts to 
reduce the carbon footprint. 
8.  ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: A 
PROACTIVE POLICY TO IMPROVE CORPORATE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE? 
Whether information disclosure can be used as a policy instrument in  its own right or 
complement regulatory and market-based instruments, it entails a different role for the 
government, offering the possibility of fulfilling the large and growing need for environmental 
protection despite limited budgets and staff (Tietenberg 1998). The five examples in section 
7 indicate that environmental disclosure strategies have sometimes substituted for traditional 
approaches and even complemented them. 
A typical voluntary information disclosure strategy by a company involves two factors: 
information quality—measured by the usefulness of content and the adequacy of 
information; and system quality—measured by the overall satisfaction of stakeholders. 
Information disclosure involves four separate steps: (i) establishing mechanisms for 
discovering environmental risks at the company level, (ii) assuring the reliability of 
information, (iii) publicizing or sharing the information, and (iv) acting on the information. 
Moreover, two important issues pertain to voluntary information disclosure: (i) self-selection, 
only those firms with easy abatement possibilities participate in such programs, and (ii) 
policy works for low-cost abatement as the decline in emissions taper off after the first few 
years. 
The important and indirect effect of the mandated public disclosure program is the access to 
and use of the information by the relevant stakeholders. Local environment groups and 
media can use the information to apply pressure on local industries. Investors and citizens 
can use the information to plan  the location of investments. Environmental information 
disclosure has led to public pressure for accountability of the worst polluters. Even the mere 
anticipation of public pressure can make companies alter their behavior. Actually, 
information disclosure  and ratings provide a reputation incentive to a corporation. All 
companies want a good rating and a green public image in the globalized economy—more 
so when concern about environmental issues among investors and regulatory authorities is 
on the rise. There is a clear incentive for companies to improve environmental performance 
and to share the information, which can be the most powerful factor. Disclosing information 
is particularly effective in the case of hot-spot areas and high-impact sectors. By giving 
information, the decision would primarily lie in the hands of prospective investors or the 
community. The benefits and some limits to the environmental information disclosure 
schemes are illustrated in Table 4. ADBI Working Paper 305         Anbumozhi, Chotichanathawong, and Murugesh 
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Table 4: Benefits and Limits of Environmental Information Disclosure Rating Schemes 
Benefits  Limits 
Key advantages of successful environmental 
information disclosure are 
(i)  improved dialogue and trust between 
corporations and government, and 
corporations and the community; and 
corporation to corporation leads to more 
cooperative relationships and greater 
certainty in improved environmental 
performance 
(ii)  greater flexibility than command and control, 
particularly in complex or rapidly changing 
contexts, offering more ambitious goals, and 
lowering administrative and enforcement 
costs 
(iii) long-term changes in corporate 
management behavior, i.e., a shift from 
reactionary, end-of-pipe and financial cost 
attitudes to proactive, cleaner production, 
economic savings behavior  
Environmental information disclosure can not be 
on its own: 
(i)  deal with free riders—voluntary disclosure 
schemes may not incite all companies to 
participate and can not on their own deal 
with poor performers who fail to 
acknowledge market and community signals 
(ii)  it is limited to areas where there is less 
public recognition for environmental 
protection and avoidance of strict standards 
is a customary norm by business 
(iii) ensure global application—information 
disclosure schemes are being developed 
and applied differently in different national 
and socioeconomic contexts  
Source: Authors. 
Furthermore, to enhance the credibility of any information disclosure schemes with all 
stakeholders, a careful process for scrutinizing the ratings at different checkpoints is 
required. Since information disclosure is often a strategic activity for a corporation, it needs 
to be thought through beforehand before releasing the results. In many cases, large polluters 
and emitters may also be large employment providers. It may be in the interest of the 
economy to give them a grace period before full public disclosure of environmental 
information. In the PRC, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the programs allowed poorly rated 
factories a grace period before formal public disclosure. Environmental information 
disclosure also promotes flexible responses because companies that choose to improve 
their public image are able to reduce their emissions in the cheapest way available to them 
(Grafton et al. 2004). 
Environmental information disclosure combines conventional environmental monitoring, self-
regulation, and public pressure using environmental ratings to promote better corporate 
environmental management, thus forming an effective tool to protect the environment in 
developing Asia. Environmental information disclosure schemes not only bring transparency 
into the environmental performance of companies and put public pressure on them to 
constantly upgrade their work in this area, but it will also go a long way to lifting 
environmental concerns within the companies themselves, right to the top (Coglianese and 
Nash 2001). Disclosure and rating programs make corporate leaders realize that 
environmental compliance should not be restricted to meeting standard norms but can 
actually become a proactive exercise in which regulatory norms constitute only the minimum 
effort. The business perspectives to this approach, drivers, and barriers to participating in 
this program need further analyses. 
9.  REMAINING ISSUES AND POINTS FOR DISCUSSION 
The potential for environmental information disclosure schemes to improve corporate 
environmental performance and fill the gaps in existing systems are promising. They could 
herald a new wave in environment policy, but such a conclusion will require additional 
research beyond that provided in this paper. The evidence that we have at this point is too 
sketchy to allow us to make convincing policy recommendations. It is possible however, to 
generate some questions in choosing policies that are consistent with available evidence. If ADBI Working Paper 305         Anbumozhi, Chotichanathawong, and Murugesh 
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and when these hypotheses are supported by further evidence, they could form the basis for 
an enhanced policy-making process. Important questions for further research include the 
following: 
  Do investments in the provision of environmental information yield rates of return that 
compare favorably with other measures? Evidence indicates such approaches have 
significantly reduced pollution in a variety of settings. In the case of TRI, PROPER, and 
Green Watch, abatement was induced at low regulatory cost. However, evidence on the 
cost-effectiveness of  these programs remains sparse. Rigorous cost-effectiveness 
analysis is needed. Public disclosure of environmental performance can facilitate a 
diversity of local solutions to environmental problems that no command and control 
system or otherwise market-based mechanisms could encompass.  
  What drives companies to disclose environmental information? Current evidence 
suggests that large firms with great environmental impacts are most likely to participate, 
but no examples suggest that factories get a free ride on emission or pollution reduction 
prior to program initiation. This also does not suggest that they participate only to divert 
attention from poor compliance and regulatory capture or to face strong regulation or get 
favorable recognition from markets and communities. In other words, various drivers 
and barriers existing for companies to voluntarily participate in the programs should be 
studied further. 
  Which type of information provision yields the highest rate of return for business? The 
information quality, i.e., adequacy of information and system quality—perceptions of 
community and markets—can have a large impact on the effectiveness of the program. 
Too much information can bring adverse impacts as well. Under what circumstances 
would highly aggregated and structured information be preferred to the provision of 
more data? 
  What are the critical external and internal means by which disclosure of environmental 
information spur improved environmental performance? Providing factory managers and 
owners information about their firms’ net emissions with abatement opportunities, which 
is principally an environmental audit, may be a key internal means to improve 
environmental performance. ADBI Working Paper 305         Anbumozhi, Chotichanathawong, and Murugesh 
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